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Gender and Bank Lending after the Global Financial Crisis:  
Are Women Entrepreneurs Safer Bets? 
 
 
Abstract 
Using gender as a theoretical framework, we analyse the dynamics of bank lending to small 
and medium sized enterprises (SME) in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
Using six waves of the SME Finance Monitor survey, we apply a formal Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition to test whether gender impacts upon the supply and demand for debt finance 
by women. Reflecting established evidence, we found women had a lower demand for bank 
loans; contradicting accepted wisdom however, we found that women who did apply were 
more likely to be successful. We argue that feminised risk aversion might inform more 
conservative applications during a period of financial uncertainty which may be beneficial for 
women in terms of gaining loans. However, we also uncover more subtle evidence suggesting 
that bank decisions may differ for women who may be unfairly treated in terms of collateral 
but regarded more positively when holding large cash balances.  
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1. Introduction  
Since the 1990s, there has been a growing interest in the influence of gender upon 
women’s entrepreneurial activities (Henry, Foss and Ahl, 2016; Marlow and Martinez-Dy, 
2018). A dedicated theme emerging from this critique has been access to business funding to 
support entrepreneurial endeavours (Marlow and Patton, 2005; Carter, Shaw, Lam, et al., 
2007; Coleman and Robb, 2015). Given the market vulnerability of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs), attaining access to appropriate forms of finance can be challenging 
(Roberts, 2015). A well-rehearsed debate suggests women business owners are further 
disadvantaged by discriminatory gendered ascriptions which potentially affect both the supply 
and demand of business funding; this in turn, impacts upon venture sustainability and growth 
(Marlow and Patton, 2005; Alesina and Lotti, 2008; Colman and Robb, 2009). We add a new 
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dimension to this debate by critically analysing the impact of the 2008 global finance crisis 
(GFC) upon bank lending practices to women business owners in the UK.   
After 2008, the GFC had a far-reaching impact upon the small firm finance landscape 
(Cowling, Liu, and Ledger, 2012; Vermoesen, Deloof, and Laveren, 2013).  Such effects have 
persisted beyond the GFC into a subsequent world recession (Jones-Evans, 2015; Lee, Sabeen, 
and Cowling, 2015). This period of turbulence was associated with ‘extremely tight credit 
conditions’ (Piacentini; 2013: 24) for small firm borrowing through either retracted lending or 
higher financing costs (Duarte, Gama, and Gulamhussen, 2018). Given the catastrophic effect 
of the GFC, it is critical to delve more deeply into the effects of this event from a more nuanced 
perspective. 
To contribute to this debate therefore, we develop a number of research objectives which 
aim to explore how gender influences access to bank lending for women business owners 
during the context of the GFC. Thus, our first research objective focuses upon the demand-
side of the credit market. It is suggested that women have a greater propensity for risk aversion 
which may constrain lower levels of demand for business finance (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; 
Huang and Kisgen, 2013). We also consider how behaviours may shape the capital structures 
of male and female businesses in this context. It is expected that this tendency for risk-aversion 
would be exacerbated during periods of financial uncertainty (Prugl, 2012). Our second 
objective explores supply side issues regarding whether women business owners have equal 
access to loans, and whether this has been affected by the GFC. The broad evidence suggests 
that generically, women use smaller amounts of start-up capital (Fairlie and Robb, 2009; 
Cesaroni, Sentuti, and Buratti, 2015) and experience higher liquidity constraints in terms of 
income and personal wealth (Rybczynski, 2015). We would therefore, expect the GFC to have 
a greater influence upon access to loans which may in turn, exacerbate notions of risk and 
contribute to discouragement (Cowling, Liu, Minniti et al, 2016; Rostamkalaie, Nitani and 
Riding, 2018). Our final research objective explores issues of gender discrimination against 
women applying for loans in the post GFC era. In so doing, we also acknowledge substantial 
changes in the technology utilised within contemporary banking in developed economies to 
inform loan decisions (Frame and White, 2014). To explore these objectives, we draw upon 
data from six waves of the UK SME Finance Monitor survey from 2011 to explore patterns of 
lending during this period. We apply a formal Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to test whether 
differences in the supply and demand for debt finance might be explained by variance in the 
firm profile or whether gender based discrimination is evident. 
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Our contribution is broadly two fold.  Theoretically, we add a more nuanced analysis to 
the prevailing logic that in terms of access to bank funding, women are universally 
disadvantaged by gendered ascriptions.  We challenge this axiom when arguing that in a 
context of financial recession, prototypical forms of femininity actually become advantageous 
as banks seek to hedge risks by favouring more conservative lenders. Additionally, we are one 
of few studies to acknowledge the growing importance of algorithms as an objective sorting 
device which can favour female lenders. Thus, we draw upon theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence to over-turn existing prejudicial assumptions that women are less attractive 
borrowers once context is factored into the argument. In addition, we suggest there may be a 
‘virtuous circle’ created here in that the reputation of women borrowers will be enhanced as 
they prove to be ‘better bets’ for banks whilst growing dependence upon algorithms should 
reduce gender discrimination [we acknowledge that attention must be afforded to the 
construction of algorithms to address biased measures]. On the basis of an enhanced reputation 
as borrowers, we suggest this effect will persist beyond recessionary periods and so, there will 
be a lasting benefit for women business owners seeking debt finance. Empirically, we employ 
a novel method (Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition) to separate the gender differences in credit 
demand and supply that are explained by the institutional, individual and behavioural 
characteristics of businesses run by men and women, from those attributed to gender 
discrimination.  Consequently, we present evidence which contradicts the current axioms 
regarding gender, women and bank lending and so, encourage future research to explore 
whether a recessionary effect has prompted a broader change in the perception of women 
borrowers.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly outline our foundational 
theoretical framing regarding gender and its impact upon entrepreneurial activity with a focus 
upon funding issues. We then present our empirical data and the descriptive statistics, followed 
by regression results on our loan demand and supply models by applying a decomposition 
analysis to isolate potential gender discrimination in loan markets. We discuss the implications 
of our arguments when concluding in the final section.  
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
2.1  Gender, entrepreneurship and bank lending 
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Unlike sex, which is associated with biological categorisation (Kaiser, 2012)1, gender has 
no substantive form. Yet, it is universally acknowledged as a fundamental identity marker 
which makes human subjects mutually intelligible with a spectrum of characteristics captured 
within notions of masculinity and femininity (Oakley, 1979; Butler, 2004). Although gender 
is enacted as a multiplicity, such that individuals exhibit diverse and often, melded gender 
identities and behaviours (Linstead and Pullen, 2006), there is a persistent association between 
masculinity/male and femininity/female with a continuum between this binary (Bowden and 
Mummery, 2013). In addition to being a sense making device, gender attributes value to 
human action merely by the ascription of masculinity or femininity which universally, 
devalues the latter (Bradley, 2007; Lindsey, 2015). Simply put, stereotypical feminine 
characteristics whether articulated by men or women, are deemed to be of lower value than 
those associated with masculinity (Fine, 2010).  Whilst such degrees of valorisation are context 
driven, gendered spaces, activities and characteristics associated with femininity are deemed 
of lesser value (Bowden and Mummery, 2014). Drawing upon this very brief review, we 
summarise that human activities are embedded within contextualised gendered norms which 
inform social orders; that which is associated with the feminine however, is afforded a lower 
value informing discriminatory practices.   
It terms of entrepreneurship, it has been acknowledged that the preferred entrepreneurial 
profile reflects masculine traits such competitiveness, aggression and risk taking (Ahl, 2006; 
McAdam, 2012, Jennings and Brush, 2013). This has informed a ‘masculinised discourse’ 
within entrepreneurship which generates a preferred entrepreneurial prototype which 
privileges men and disadvantages women (Ahl, 2006, Marlow, Carter and Shaw, 2008). 
Analysing the performance of matched weighted samples of firms suggests there is no 
essential entrepreneurial deficiency attributable to owner sex (Robb and Watson, 2012). 
Rather, gendered ascriptions constrain women’s accrual of entrepreneurial capital and 
legitimacy limiting their entrepreneurial potential and evaluations of their capabilities (Calas, 
Smircich and Bourne, 2009; Marlow and Martinez-Dy, 2018). Consequently, as an outcome 
of structural and tacit discrimination, there are fewer women entrepreneurs per se – within 
Europe they represent around 25% of firm owners (30% of self-employed) (Deloittes, 2016); 
they are more likely to own younger, marginal firms in lower performing sub-sectors of the 
service industry and are over-represented as owners of home-based part-time ventures 
                                                          
1 There is now some debate regarding sex as a binary biological category given debates around intersex 
individuals such that it might be argued that there are multiple sex categories (Fine, 2017)  
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(McAdam, 2012; Carter et al., 2015).  Not surprisingly, given this operating profile, women 
are also more likely to depend upon informal sources of funding such as savings, credit and 
family support (Anyadike-Danes, Hart and Du, 2015; Roberts, 2015; Lim and Suh, 2019).    
In addition to such constraints, which encourage dependency upon informal funding, 
women are deemed to have a lower toleration for risk in terms of financial behaviour across a 
range of activities including investment, stock trading, salary enhancement, business funding 
and general money management (Barber and Odean: 2001; Beckman and Menkhof: 2008; 
Hastings, Madrian and Skimmyghorn, 2013). In the context of entrepreneurship, risk 
toleration is a central issue given the uncertainty of entrepreneurial outcomes (Block, Sander 
and Speigel, 2015).  Consequently, feminised notions of financial risk-aversion have been 
disadvantageous in terms of business finance so for example, Speelman, Clark-Murphy, and 
Gerrans (2013) found that gender and risk tolerance were the dominant factors in explaining 
investment behaviours with women favouring lower risk options. 
In relation to the most frequently used form of finance, bank lending, gendered 
differences in risk tolerance have been identified for latent and actual entrepreneurs (Verheul 
et al., 2012).  As such, risk-aversion influences demand for bank loans whereby women 
business owners exhibit greater reluctance to assume debt (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Huang 
and Kisgen, 2013; Carter et al., 2015). Accordingly, the picture painted by prevailing evidence 
regarding demand suggests a scenario where a number of factors coalesce to channel women 
towards dependency upon informal funding, whilst those who do seek formal funding may be 
more cautious in their ambitions, given feminised risk aversion.  Despite the body of evidence 
exploring these arguments (Carter, et al., 2007; Coleman and Robb, 2009; Freel, Carter, Tagg 
et al., 2012; McAdam, 2012; Roberts, 2015) there is an assumption of a static model of lending 
which fails to factor in differential contexts shaping loan conditions.  So for example, we know 
very little about how the impact of the GFC affected attitudes to lending (Cowling, Liu, and 
Ledger, 2012).  Thus, to contribute to this debate we suggest two competing hypotheses which 
recognise potential constraints upon informal funding during this period encouraging demand 
to switch to formal funding but this may be tempered by feminised risk aversion.   
H1a: Women business owners will have a lower demand for bank loans due to 
relatively lower risk tolerance and so, unwillingness to take on debt in periods of 
economic crisis 
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H1b: Women business owners will have a higher demand for bank loans due to their 
inability to finance their businesses from internal sources in periods of economic crisis 
2.2  Loan supply 
The theory of bank loan supply in the presence of asymmetric information pertaining to 
funding application approvals demonstrates some consensus (Besanko and Thakor, 1987; 
Melnik and Plaut, 1986; Sharpe, 1990; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  Extensions to general 
theories of the bank decision-making process have been made to include the effects of long-
term relationships (Uchida, Udell, and Yamori, 2012; Beck, Behr and Madestam, 2014) and a 
repeated, dynamic process of lending over time (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983).  Banks make 
lending decisions both in terms of whether to make an offer to the firm and, if so, under what 
conditions. They draw upon observable characteristics (associated with risk of non-
repayment) verifiable given the distribution of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ borrowers, and their 
opportunity cost of capital. Efforts are made to induce borrowers to reveal their quality and 
invest greater commitment to a successful outcome with more favourable consideration for 
collateral supported loan applications. Importantly, both are initially unobservable to the bank. 
Commonly identified risk factors that influence the bank lending decision, and the loan price, 
include venture age (Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2007), size (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), 
the availability of collateral or guarantee (Coco, 2000; de Rassenfosse and Fischer, 2016; 
Leeth and Scott, 1989) and length of the venture-bank relationship (Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Han, Zhang and Greene, 2017). 
At a theoretical level, there should be no observable differences between male and female 
owned businesses per se in respect of their ability to access bank loans if business 
characteristics are similar. However, due to broader structural socio economic discrimination, 
women as a category have access to lower levels of collateral and/or entrepreneurial capital to 
support loan applications (Marlow and Patton, 2005; McAdam, 2012). These factors, plus, 
their poor fit with the masculinised entrepreneurial prototype ensures that women business 
owners seeking finance may be more likely to experience overt and tacit forms of 
discrimination (Coleman and Robb, 2015; Saparito et al., 2012). So for instance, an analysis 
of 7,800 lines of venture credit in Italy revealed that loan officers applied higher collateral 
requirements and tighter credit limits upon women entrepreneurs (Bellucci, Borisov, and 
Zazzaro; 2010). Thus, tacit discrimination informs internalised assumptions of female deficit 
(Fine, 2010).  Gendered ascriptions are also a powerful signalling device to potential investors 
8 
 
(Eddleston et al., 2016). Alsos and Ljunggren (2016) found that during the search for 
investment, women were more likely to adopt ‘compensation strategies’ such as involving 
men in the bidding team in an effort to overcome the deficit associated with femininity 
whereas, ‘ male entrepreneurs seem to have a lesser need to use compensatory signalling 
strategies’ (Alsos and Ljunggren, 2016:18).  
It is suggested that such negative connotations will become more salient during periods 
of uncertainty that prompt greater caution amongst lenders (Thebaud and Sharkey, 2016). As 
such, when assessing applications from women entrepreneurs during such periods, lenders 
demand higher levels of collateral and seek more convincing signals of competency to 
overcome the status deficit associated with femininity. Consequently, we might expect 
subjective discrimination biases to be more influential during a period of economic distress 
when lenders perceive women loan applicants as less adept financial managers.  
Yet, this negative picture is not universal; recently, Cole (2013) and Isaksson and 
Quoreshi (2015) find that women business owners are more likely to be granted loans; it has 
been suggested that this may be related to greater risk-aversity such that they present stronger 
applications and/or ask for smaller loans.  Indeed, reflecting the contemporary shift regarding 
the desirability for prudence within capital markets and the public narrative of female caution, 
this combined discourse generates a context where women may be more likely to be offered a 
loan whereby conservative applications become more attractive in a context of economic 
distress. 
Regarding loan supply, we propose two competing hypotheses; 
H2a: Women business owners will have a higher probability of loan rejection as 
they lack savings and assets to post against bank loans and are subject to gender 
discrimination; this probability increases during periods of economic distress. 
H2b: In the absence of discrimination women business owners will have a lower 
probability of loan rejection as they are more risk averse and hence, more likely to 
achieve a successful project outcome; this probability increases during periods of 
economic distress. 
2.3 The effect of GFC 
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The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 accelerated the onset of a global 
banking crisis (EIB, 2015). Consequently, balance sheets were severely weakened restricting 
funds for lending as banks, regulators, and governments made large provisions for losses 
(Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). In the small firm lending market, access to credit became 
more restrictive; when loans were offered, conditions were more onerous (EIB, 2015); lending 
rates increased, collateral requirements were higher, and lines of credit were reduced (Fougere 
et al., 2012; Vermoesen, Deloof, and Laveren, 2013). The GFC, and the economic downturn 
that it induced on a global scale, also had firm level effects. In periods of reduced demand for 
the products and services of smaller firms, many scaled down growth plans (Cowling et al., 
2015) leading to a reduction in the demand for investment capital. This occurred alongside a 
more general downturn in firm performance over the recessionary cycle (Smallbone et 
al.,2012), although it has been suggested that there have been differential effects, with new 
firms experiencing more pronounced declines in performance (Grilli, 2011).  
Given our previous debate regarding gendered aspects of the supply of, and demand for, 
bank loans, we argue that our general hypotheses hold, but they will be magnified in the post-
GFC environment. As noted, if funding applications are of similar quality, the sex of the owner 
should be immaterial. Gendered analyses of discrimination (Marlow and Patton, 2005; Carter 
et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2014; Cesaroni and Sentuti, 2016) however, suggest that the status 
bias within the loan application process critically disadvantages women entrepreneurs and this 
be exacerbated during times of financial crisis. This assumption however, does not 
acknowledge the shifting tenor of debate regarding the association between excessive 
machismo, masculinity and reckless investment behaviour, and the GFC which, it is being 
suggested would not have arisen had women, with assumed greater prudence, been more 
influential during this era (Basch, 2009; Kay and Shipman, 2009).  Captured by the reflection, 
‘If Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters’ there are suggestions that the financial crash 
might have been avoided had the investment activities of reckless men been constrained by 
their more cautious female counterparts (Sunderland, 2009). Thus, whilst feminised risk 
aversion has previously deemed disadvantageous in the context of financial management there 
is now almost a volte face regarding the desirability of female responsibility as a restraint upon 
masculinised recklessness. It is interesting to see women now dubbed the ‘Sheriffs of Wall 
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Street’ (Scherer, 2010)2. Whilst substantive evidence for alleged feminised prudence remains 
limited and essentialised notions of risk aversity are questionable (Marlow and Swail, 2014; 
Fine, 2017), the prevailing discourse has been influential in positioning women as a desirable 
cautious presence within the realms of financial management (Broadbridge and Simpson, 
2011; Prugl, 2012).  
In addition to shifting gendered perceptions of desirable investment and borrowing 
practices, the increasing use of technology for credit scoring to assess loan applications is 
potentially influential in reducing discriminatory practices.  As such, banks are deploying 
innovative new lending technologies to capture the hard information required to inform 
lending decisions (Baum, Caglayan, and Ozkan, 2009; Goh and Kauffman, 2013). Frame and 
White (2014), in a detailed review conclude that technological change has fundamentally 
altered the nature of banks services and products. Specifically, the ability to use advanced 
statistical techniques to credit score lending applications in consumer and business markets 
has increased exponentially as computing power and software have advanced. Such advanced 
risk measurement systems are increasingly common becoming a statutory requirement by 
national and international banking regulators as key tools in stress testing of financial 
institutions. This generates a swifter and ostensibly more objective lending decision process.  
Whilst for banks and smaller ventures, the empirical evidence suggests that the adoption 
of IT based technologies in the loan market has had little discernible impact on the volume of 
credit available at the portfolio or individual firm level (McNulty, Murdock & Richie, 2013). 
It may however, be fuelling a more efficient decision process.  Indeed,  several studies (Einav, 
Jenkins & Levin, 2013; Hernando & Nieto, 2007; Ciciretti, Hasan & Zazzara, 2009) found 
that shifts to IT based lending technologies and internet banking have increased bank profits. 
This implies that the quality of lending has either remained constant or increased, and the 
banks cost of lending has fallen. With the advent of hard information-based lending procedures 
and technologies, we suggest that such changes may prove advantageous to women previously  
detrimentally affected by status bias if subjective assessments of an applicant’s ‘fit’ with 
stereotypical notions of preferred borrowers are diminished.  
                                                          
2 A note of caution here; whilst there has been much poplar debate and aspersions regarding the desirability of 
women occupying more influential positions in the investment industry, their jobs have been subject to higher 
levels of cuts during the recession, they are still a small minority in top positions in leading investment firms 
while the evidence for alleged feminised prudence is based upon gendered stereotypes and myth with little 
substantive evidence to support such claims. 
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We argue that contemporary debate surrounding small firm bank lending within 
developed economies must acknowledge recent shifts in the financial environment and the use 
of IT within funding decisions. Specifically, we offer a more informed notion of how 
developments in loan assessments may challenge previous gendered biases applied to women 
business owners applying for debt funding.  The approach in this study, using a decomposition 
approach, not only allows us to identify whether there are significant gender based differences 
in patterns of loan demand and the willingness of banks to meet these loan requests, but adds 
greater insight by seeking to quantify just what proportion of these two decisions (the 
entrepreneur and the bank) can be meaningfully explained by gender based differences in 
personal characteristics, firm specific characteristics and lending behaviours. The greater the 
unexplained element of these two decisions, the more imperative it is to identify alternative 
explanations for such observations.  
3. Data and Variables  
3.1 Sample 
This section describes the data source and the survey method from which the data is 
derived, followed by a discussion on both the dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis. The data corresponds to six waves of the SME Finance Monitor surveys conducted 
by BDRC Continental. The first survey wave was in July 2011, with subsequent waves 
undertaken in November 2011, March 2012, May 2012, November 2012 and the most recent 
in March 2013. In total this represents 30,183 completed surveys. In order to qualify for 
interview, firms had to meet the following criteria in addition to the quotas by size, sector, and 
region: 
 not 50%+ owned by another company 
 not run as a social enterprise or as a not for profit organisation 
 turnover of less than £25m 
 The respondent was the person in charge of managing the business’s finances. No 
changes have been made to the screening criteria in any of the waves conducted to 
date. 
Quotas were set by size of business and by number of employees. The classic B2B sample 
structure over-samples the larger firms compared to their natural representation in the small 
firm population. In order to generate robust sub-samples of larger firms, fewer interviews were 
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conducted with zero employee ventures. Each quarter’s sample matched that of the previous 
quarter results as closely as possible. Quotas were set to reflect the natural profile by sector, 
but with some amendments to ensure that a robust sub-sample was available for each sector. 
Thus, fewer interviews were conducted in Construction and Property/Business Services to 
allow for interviews in other sectors to be increased, in particular for Agriculture and Hotels. 
The weighting regime was initially applied separately to each quarter. The six quarters were 
then combined and grossed to the total of 4,548,843 firms, based on BIS data. This ensured 
that each individual wave is representative of all firms whilst the total interviews conducted 
are also weighted to the total of all firms. 
3.2 Dependent variables 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the definition of dependent variables, which capture demand 
for, and bank supply of, external finance. Both variables are binary and static in nature. 
Demand for finance is defined as whether entrepreneurs reported having sought/applied for 
finance for their ventures in the previous twelve months. Supply of finance is defined as 
whether the firm obtained (all or part of) the finance required. On average between July 2011 
and March 2013, 23.7% SMEs sought debt finance.  
3.3 Explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables for the supply and demand of finance are generally related to the 
development stage of the venture and the degree of information opacity between the venture 
and finance suppliers, which have been shown to be significant by prior studies. Panel B of 
Table 1 defines the explanatory variables by these four groups. Firm characteristics include 
venture size, legal status, sector, age, and performance. Size is measured by employee number 
and sales turnover. The former defines a business as micro- (up to nine employees), small- (10 
to 49 employees) and medium-sized (50 to 249 employees) enterprise, and the latter is grouped 
into nine bands with an upper limit of £9.99 million. Legal status is defined by four categories 
including sole trader, partnership, LLP and Limited liability. Sector is defined as nine one-
digit SIC codes. Age is defined in six categories from <12 months old to >15 years old. We 
have two measures of performance available; first, the annual profit/loss of the firm and 
second, a fast-growth identifier variable.  
Owner characteristics and human capital measures consist of (highest) formal educational 
qualification, prior business experience, and whether or not the entrepreneur holds a financial 
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qualification. Firm-level risk indicators include the Experian risk classification which has four 
categories:  Minimal, Low, Average and Above Average. It is based upon a mix of three core 
metrics; the cash volume of debt; the term structure of debt, and; incidences of legal 
proceedings for non-payment of outstanding debts. In addition, there are six independent 
measures of financial delinquency including non-payment of loans, unauthorised overdraft 
borrowing, refused cheques, County Court Judgements, late payment of tax and trade credit 
restrictions. 
We also consider additional control variables regarding source of finance, business 
activities and possible credit support provided for finance application. Regarding the source 
of finance, we consider whether or not the venture is using personal equity. Business activities 
concern operating behaviours including innovation, the development of new process and 
products and the degree of internationalisation (whether the venture exports products 
overseas). The availability of business plans is used as a proxy for financial security or credit 
support for the application. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables by owner 
sex. The proportion of loan applications is 23.5% and 24.1% for male and female business 
owners, respectively. Amongst those who applied for finance, 89.8% of men have attained at 
least part of the loan for which they applied; the number is slightly higher at 90.4%, for women. 
Nonetheless, the differences in the likelihood of loan demand and successful application are 
in both cases statistically insignificant.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the dynamics of loan demand and supply over the six waves 
of the Finance Monitor data. The two key dynamics in terms of both loan demand and supply 
are (a) that they rose over time as more loans were requested and a higher proportion were 
granted, and, (b) that both demand and supply became more stable and less subject to variation 
quarter to quarter (except for loan demand for male entrepreneurs in earlier 2013). This 
suggests that the market is moving back onto a stable equilibrium path after the obvious 
mismatch between supply and demand for loans in the immediate aftermath of the financial 
crisis and the first two years of recession (as identified by Cowling, Liu, and Ledger, 2012). 
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However, it can be seen that women entrepreneurs become more active in seeking finance 
over time after the recession and in turn, the likelihood of a successful application for women 
exceeds that of male peers with the improvement of the economic environment. 
Fig 1: Historical Loan Demand by Gender 
[INSERT FIG 1 HERE] 
Fig 2: Historical Loan Supply by Gender 
[INSERT FIG 2 HERE] 
In terms of business characteristics, our data show that women-owned businesses are on 
average, smaller and younger; as owners, women have less entrepreneurial experience but 
higher levels of education. These characteristics suggest a higher degree of business risk for 
such firms with a greater possibility of financial delinquency. However, a striking difference 
is that women owned firms seeking finance are more likely to be high growth, and innovative. 
This supports the notion that owner sex does not impair entrepreneurial competency (Robb 
and Watson, 2012). Rather, whilst gendered ascriptions appear to limit women’s opportunities 
to create ventures with scope for innovation and growth which require formal funding (Marlow 
and McAdam, 2015), when they do negotiate such barriers they are more likely to attain 
funding.  In other words, women may be less likely to create innovative growth ventures 
(Anyadike-Danes, et al., 2015) but if they do so, and apply for bank funding, they are more 
likely to be successful.    
4. Empirical results 
As a preliminary analysis, we first model the demand for, and supply of, external debt 
finance between July 2011 and March 2013, the third and fourth years since the GFC, using 
gender as an independent variable. By definition, the outcome of a finance application is only 
recorded if a firm actually sought finance (Cosh et al., 2009). As both of the dependent 
variables are by construction binary variables, a probit model with selection3 is used and the 
maximum likelihood coefficient estimates are shown in Table 34. We use this econometric 
method, to test for sample selection effects given the possible non-randomness of loan 
application decisions. For the identification to be valid, the model requires that the selection 
                                                          
3 See Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) for an introduction of the model. 
4 As an alternative, we also fitted the data using the logit model and the results are not significantly different from 
the probit estimations. 
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(i.e. demand) equation includes at least one variable that is not included in the main probit (i.e. 
supply) equation. Here we use 12 geographical region indicators as the demand-specific 
variables in the model as they are found to be significantly associated with loan demand but 
have no explanatory power for loan supply. The chi-test of independence between the selection 
and main equations is rejected at 5% level, indicating the existence of selection bias and the 
validity of our model. 
Women entrepreneurs are less likely to apply for finance (= -0.11, p < 0.05) but are 
more likely to be successful once a loan application has been submitted ( = 0.15, p < 0.1). In 
marginal terms (results not reported), this translates to probability differentials of -1.8% and 
1.5% for loan demand and supply, respectively. Generally speaking, loan demand increases 
with venture size and age. Further, loan demand is generally unrelated with the risk profile of 
a firm, or the degree of financial delinquency. In the case of loan supply, it is found that finance 
is generally advanced to firms that are more mature, have high credit rating and lower degrees 
of financial delinquency.  
To make sure that the low demand for finance by female entrepreneurs is not a result of 
women being more likely to be discouraged from the credit market, Model 2 of Table 3 
formally tests the conditional probability of discouragement given that a firm is in need of 
external finance. Here we define a discouraged borrower as a firm that needed external 
finance, but did not apply as it was assumed that either the financing costs5 were too high, or 
the application would be rejected. Our results show that the lower application rate by women 
is caused by their genuine lower demand for external finance ( = -0.18, p < 0.01). Once the 
lower demand is controlled for, women are actually less likely to be discouraged ( = -0.16, p 
< 0.01), by a marginal probability of 2.3% compared to men. It is worth noting, that credit 
discouragement is significantly affected by risk rating and financial delinquency (e.g. 
unauthorized overdraft and court judgement), suggesting riskier small business borrowers 
have objectively assessed their credit risk and made rational financing decisions accordingly. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
However, it is the primary objective of this study to investigate the existence of possible 
gender discrimination in small venture debt funding, i.e. the difference in the likelihood of 
                                                          
5 The costs include both direct costs including interest charge and collateral requirement, and indirect costs 
including (a) restrictions/conditions imposed to the loan, (b) potential loss of firm control; (c) time spent on the 
application and (d) complicated application process or bank literature. 
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loan demand and supply that is not explained by group differences between female and male 
owned small firms plus, business and owner characteristics, as identified in Table 3. A 
commonly used empirical model for such comparison is the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition 
(Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). The full details of the model specification can be found in 
Appendix A.  
Table 4 reports the results for Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition for loan demand. The 
predicted likelihood for male entrepreneurs applying for finance is 18.2% and the probability 
for women, 14.6%, both significant at 1% level. The overall difference of 3.6% is also 
significant at 1% level, indicating that male owners have a notably higher credit demand than 
female owners. Around half of this overall difference (1.92%, p < 0.01) is attributed to the 
model predictors, which means that given the business and owner characteristics, women 
would have a lower propensity to seek bank finance in the first place. The unexplained part, 
never the less, shows that a male entrepreneur is 1.7% more likely to apply for finance (p < 
0.05) even if he runs exactly the same business as a comparable female entrepreneur. The latter 
coefficient estimate is a clear sign that lower loan demand by women entrepreneurs is also 
driven by other factors unrelated to personal and firm specific demographics.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
We use the same model to decompose the differences in the probabilities that the 
entrepreneur successfully attains the required loan. In order to capture the conditionality of 
loan supply, we adjust the model for the inverse mills ratio calculated from a probit model for 
loan demand, similar to the model used in Table 3. Partly consistent with the pilot analysis, 
the probability of securing at least part of the loan required conditional on loan application is 
84.5% for male entrepreneurs and 5.5% higher (90.0%) for women, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. The difference is neither explained by firm- or owner-level 
characteristics, nor by possible discrimination in the small venture loan market.  
5. Robustness checks 
We have identified significant gender differences in both the financing decisions and 
outcomes by SME borrowers. We proposed three potential channels through which such 
differences arise, namely the effect of GFC, the availability of collateral, and entrepreneurial 
risk-aversion. In this section, we conduct further checks to explore the mechanisms of the 
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gender difference, using information from the existing data set. The full regression results are 
reported in Tables 5 to 8.  
We are not able to check the direct effect of GFC since our data only covers post-crisis 
periods. Instead, we use the quarterly GDP (inflation-adjusted) growth for each of the six 
survey waves (Model 1, Table 5) to proxy for the broader macroeconomic environment. Here 
we find no gender difference in terms of credit demand, but women-owned businesses are 
more likely to be approved finance during lower GDP growth periods, indicating that more 
conservative risk attitudes among women entrepreneurs may be influential upon bank 
financing decisions during an economic downturn. Such an effect is not found using simple 
year indicators (Model 2, Table 5). Further, we find a negative effect of the interaction between 
women-owned business and profit on credit demand (Model 1, Table 6). This shows that 
financing constraints has a stronger demand-side effect for women than men.    
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
We use three proxies for collateral availability. First, we use a direct indicator whether 
or not any security was provided during the loan application (Model 2, Table 6). We find that 
applications with security are more likely to succeed, but also a significantly negative 
interaction between women and security provision. This suggests that a one-dollar-value of 
collateral provided by a women entrepreneur is seen as less valuable than an equivalent, male 
entrepreneur. However, when we use the firm’s credit balance (held in current and deposit 
accounts) as a proxy for loan guarantee (Model 3, Table 6), we find that women-owned 
businesses with higher cash balance are more likely to be approved. The combined result 
shows that lenders tend to assign different values to alternative forms of collateral provided 
by women, this is potentially a result of gender discrimination and warrants further 
investigations in future research. Finally, we also use the firm’s legal form to proxy for 
collateral (Model 4, Table 6) due to the different obligations by limited and unlimited 
companies but find no significant gender difference. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Risk preference is proxied first, using the number of financial institution (Model 1, Table 
7) and then external advice sources a firm used (Model 2, Table 7). We contend that multiple 
banking relationships are favoured by more risk-averse entrepreneurs, because they allow a 
desirable sharing of borrowing risks and prevent exploitation by a single bank (Foglia, Laviola 
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and Reedtz, 1998). Seeking professional advice helps to bridge the information gap between 
small business borrowers and lenders and thus, also signals the risk-aversion of entrepreneurs. 
However, we find contrasting results for these two measures. As expected, the odds of 
successful loan application by women increases with the number of advice sources used. 
However, female applicants using more banks are less likely to be approved. This can be 
explained by the implicit signals conveyed by multiple banking relationships, in the sense that 
a firm only switches from its main bank, owing to internal problems (which the main bank 
may observe), to alternative banks which have less information about the firm. In so doing, 
the firm may face an adverse selection problem, because banks unfamiliar with the firm’s 
quality are more likely to refuse the loan application. Risk-aversion may also be proxied by 
the use of non-bank debt, such as that from friends and family, or soft finance (Model 3, Table 
7), but the coefficient estimates are insignificant. We do not find any gender difference in 
finance demand using any of the three measures of risk-aversion (results not reported given 
space constraints).  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
To further examine the mechanism of potential gender biases in the credit market, we 
empirically test whether or not there exists any synergy between collateral availability and 
risk-aversion for female borrowers, under alternative macroeconomic conditions. We choose 
security provision and the number of external advice sources as the proxy for collateral and 
risk preference, respectively based on the explanatory power of the variables in determining 
credit supply and interact them with gender and economic indicators (quarterly real GDP 
growth). The result is reported in Table 8. Despite the values of coefficient estimates due to 
possible measurement issues and the complexity in interpreting higher-order interactions, our 
finding highlights the complementarity between the collateral and risk-aversion channels. 
Here, we show that loan applications by more risk-averse women who are willing to pledge 
collateral are more likely to succeed, but this effect is more evident during low-growth rather 
than high-growth periods.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
6. Discussion and limitations 
Within this paper, we have critically evaluated the dynamics of bank lending to SMEs in 
the period of economic downturn following the GFC adopting a gendered perspective to 
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analyse the supply and demand of bank lending to women entrepreneurs. As a background to 
our analysis, we have noted contemporary debates regarding the influence of gender upon 
women’s entrepreneurial propensity and activity (Henry et al., 2015; Jennings and Brush, 
2013; Marlow and Martinez-Dy, 2018). There is consensus that women, as a category, are 
socio-economically disadvantaged by gendered ascriptions (Fine, 2017). Unsurprisingly, such 
disadvantage is reproduced in the context of entrepreneurial activity; women are deemed a 
poor ‘fit’ within the masculinised discourse of the discipline (Ahl, 2006) whilst structural 
gendered constraints limit their potential to accrue critical entrepreneurial resources (Marlow 
and McAdam, 2013). Additionally, there is a perceptual status bias against women 
entrepreneurs informing expectations that they, and their firms, will demonstrate performance 
deficits due to an essentialised lack of entrepreneurial competence.  Research challenging 
assumptions of feminised deficits (Ahl, 2006; Ahl and Marlow, 2012; Robb and Watson, 
2012) suggests that if afforded equal access to key entrepreneurial resources, such as finance, 
women have the same likelihood of creating and managing sustainable entrepreneurial 
ventures as their male counterparts.  Consequently, access to finance for women entrepreneurs 
really matters, both as an issue of equality and also, as a pathway to enhance the competitive 
performance of an economy (McAdam, 2012; Coleman and Robb, 2015). 
There is however, mixed evidence regarding women’s access to lending; given certain 
characteristics such as: owning younger ventures, concentration in lower order services, 
having less entrepreneurial experience, lower levels of personal income and wealth plus, the 
status deficit of femininity (McAdam, 2012), we would expect such characteristics to 
negatively affect both demand and supply issues. Yet, the evidence is somewhat contradictory; 
given that women are associated with greater risk aversion (Marlow and Swail, 2014) they 
may offer more conservative lending applications so, present ‘safer bets’ which act to counter 
discriminatory lending decisions. To explore such contradictory arguments, we have analysed 
how the recent global financial crises and ensuing economic uncertainty impacts upon the 
relationship between gender, women and SME bank lending. So for example, we note the 
emergence of contemporary arguments pertaining to the desirability of feminised caution 
regarding generic financial management plus, the importance of IT changes in bank lending 
systems and practices.  This contemporary and contextualised analysis informs our research 
objectives which focused upon: the supply of loans to women and effects of the GFC; demand 
for loans and effects of the GFC; shifts in banking practices and finally, the influence of gender 
discrimination upon supply and demand.   
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From these research objectives, we developed a number of hypotheses tested using the 
UK SME Finance Monitor data; Table 9 summarises our empirical findings with regard to 
these hypotheses. In terms of our first hypothesis relating to the influence of gender upon 
women’s demand for bank loans in the post GFC era, we found women entrepreneurs were 
less likely to seek finance but if they did make such an application, they were marginally more 
likely to be successful. This appears somewhat counterfactual for as noted above, women 
owned ventures are less likely to present a preferred profile for successful applications. We 
suggest this somewhat contradictory result arises from gendered risk aversity in that women 
are more likely to submit conservative, but stronger applications presenting fewer risk factors.  
In effect, risk aversion prompts higher quality at the expense of quantity and within the current 
climate, this combination becomes advantageous.  Again, contrary to received wisdom we also 
found women were less likely to be discouraged borrowers; rather, when they felt external 
finance was required they applied for it and were likely to be successful.  Thus, in the aftermath 
of the GFC,  it may be necessary to revisit notions of discouragement and how they are 
actualised  - there may be overlaps here with risk issues or levels of caution related to a more 
realistic assessment of the firm profile in terms of a positive loan decision.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
Our second hypothesis related to supply issues and the influence of discrimination in a 
post-GFC era. Using a Blinder - Oaxaca decomposition, we find that women entrepreneurs 
are 2% more likely to secure at least part of the loan in comparison to their male counterparts. 
Whilst not significant, this analysis does enable us to control for several factors relating to 
firm characteristics and importantly, it also enables us to eliminate discrimination issues. On 
this basis, we find that discrimination is not a factor in the loan decision process.  
Regarding the impact of gender upon the supply and demand of bank lending to women, 
as we have noted, previous evidence is somewhat mixed. Drawing upon gender theory per se 
(Fine, 2010 and 2017; Oakley, 2015) mapped onto an analyses of women as disadvantaged 
entrepreneurial actors, discriminatory outcomes regarding funding would be intuitively 
expected. And indeed, there is strong historical evidence for this outcome (Thebaud and 
Sharkey, 2016) and also, when discriminating in terms of forms of finance, women are barely 
visible as recipients of equity finance or as users of aspects such as factoring or leasing 
(Roberts, 2015; Alsos and Ljunggren, 2016; Coleman and Robb, 2015). Within this paper 
however, we narrow the focus to bank lending, given its position in finance pecking order, and 
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contextualise our analysis when acknowledging the impact of the GFC and the ensuing 
economic downturn. Given previous evidence, in such a context, we might expect the status 
deficit attached to women entrepreneurs, greater risk-aversity plus a range of detrimental 
personal and venture characteristics to have an exaggerated effect upon supply and demand 
issues. What we have found however, is that women are slightly more likely to be successful 
in their applications for funding.  
  This suggests that the merit of the application and the quality of the business is less 
likely to be percolated through a negative discriminatory gendered lens during the assessment 
process. Indeed, drawing upon the post-crises discourse regarding gendered attitudes towards 
risk, investment and responsibility (Broadbridge and Simpson, 2011; Prugl, 2012) 
discriminatory assumptions may now be counterpoised such that feminised ascriptions of 
prudence have been positively re-evaluated. We suggest that this discourse has accompanied 
the increasing use of IT and computer based algorithms in the lending process as banks have 
sought to cut their cost base. In short, if constructed upon neutral foundation, credit scoring 
algorithms (which are in increasingly common usage) should diminish the scope for human 
actor gender bias within the lending decision. We do not suggest that gender is 
inconsequential; clearly, allegedly neutral algorithms can reproduce human biases, 
socialisation processes shape attitudes to risk, structural disadvantages constrain women’s 
opportunities to accrue entrepreneurial competencies whilst a masculinised discourse 
generates a context unsympathetic to their presence.  What we do suggest however, is the need 
to acknowledge recent shifts in the perception of risk, the financial environment and the far 
reaching impact this has had upon bank restructuring and relatedly, the influence of IT upon 
lending decisions.   
This paper has a number of limitations; we only focus upon debt funding in the UK. There 
is considerable scope to transpose these arguments and analyses to other developed 
economies, such as the US, to explore these arguments in more detail and scope.  Whilst bank 
loans make the greatest contribution to SME finance, we acknowledge the need to explore 
how discrimination and gender mesh to impact upon women’s access to other forms of 
business finance and how these might be affected by the GFC. Moreover, we cannot comment 
on trends in loan repayment – whether higher risk aversion translates into lower levels of 
delinquency for example, so longitudinal work to explore this issue would be informative. 
This is a particularly important strand of future research for as has been noted (Prugl, 2012), 
feminised female prudence has been lauded as a particularised, essential quality of women 
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despite the lack of evidence to support such assumptions. So by  elevating women to the higher 
echelons of financial management or indeed, offering women entrepreneurs greater access to 
loans during times of financial constraint, this could be setting them up to fail.  Applying 
unsupported expectations to women as a category, during a period of down-turn, may not 
prove to be beneficial. This situation requires careful monitoring into the future particularly 
as despite the rhetoric of enhanced voice and visibility for women within financial 
management there is little evidence for an enhanced presence at the most senior levels in the 
profession (Catalyst, 2011; Post and Byron, 2015).  Consequently, the trends we identify 
require critical analysis and future monitoring.  
It would also be useful to repeat this analysis in a range of other economies where credit 
scoring technology is used to differing degrees to assess how it influences gendered issues in 
terms of discrimination and loan outcomes. Given the fundamental reconstruction of world 
banking post-GFC, and particularly state ownership of failing banks, for which our data is 
unable to account, future work may wish to consider differences in gender outcomes by bank 
type. It could also be worth conducting a replication study to test whether gender patterns in 
bank financing return to their previous situation when the economy finally reaches a period of 
stable and consistent growth. In this sense data limitations and the passage of time prevent us 
from investigating these interesting avenues. 
7. Conclusion 
Our critical contribution is to suggest that whilst women entrepreneurs are less likely to 
apply for bank lending, if they do apply, women are more marginally more likely to be 
successful. This effect is enhanced if women have greater levels of collateral whilst remaining 
risk averse which positions them as ‘ideal borrowers’ in that they have do not over extend 
whilst having a strong fall back resource.  In so doing, our study goes beyond a simple gender 
dichotomy of the small business –bank relationship in respect of loan transactions. 
Specifically, we are able to add richness and depth to our understanding of potential 
differences in (i) the rate of loan applications, (ii) the incidence of borrower discouragement, 
and, (iii) the way in which banks make their loan allocation decisions. Specifically, we are 
able to isolate and observe potential gender effects on the loan demand and supply decision 
arising from the way in which businesses are configured, the way in which their capital 
structures are organised, and the types of projects for which loan funds are sought. Further, 
we are able to examine how gender based differences in risk tolerance not only shape the way 
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men and women approach investment projects, but how banks respond to these more risk-
based behavioural characteristics. We also extend previous work in that we can look deeper 
into potential hidden discriminatory practices by banks given that explicit discrimination 
based simply on gender is unlawful. Our results show no headline gender discrimination, even 
with differences in application rates, but additional more subtle evidence that a pound of 
collateral offered by a female loan applicant is treated less favourably than a pound of 
collateral offered by a male applicant. Yet these negative gender collateral effects can be 
overturned if a female holds a substantial cash reserve in her business account. Thus, banks 
weight ‘serviceability, the ability to generate enough cash to pay the interest and capital 
repayments, more highly for female loan applicants and collateral, less so.  
Consequently, we argue, somewhat paradoxically, that higher levels of risk aversion, 
deemed disadvantageous to entrepreneurial ambitions, may actually benefit women 
entrepreneurs seeking funding as they present ‘safer bets’ in the contemporary era. But after 
looking deeper into the way in which banks arrive at their final loan decision, we uncover 
some new insights. Specifically, female loan applications suffer a relative disadvantage when 
offering collateral as security against a loan, but have a relative advantage if they have 
accumulated a large cash reserve in the business. This implies that even when the final loan 
decision observed shows no gender based discrimination, potential differences in the way 
women and men configure their businesses and behave in respect of capital structure might 
mean that certain behaviours are rewarded and punished and this has a gender aspect to it. 
Yet, we add the codicil that over the longer term, this may not necessarily be beneficial 
if women are associated with higher rates of default and failure. This tendency, combined with 
the increasing use of credit scoring algorithms does however, suggest a contemporary 
feminised benefit. As such, a potential entrepreneurial disadvantage, that of risk aversion, is 
reformulated as advantageous during a period of economic uncertainty. How such issues shape 
banking estimates of the true risk of lending requires far greater consideration (Delis, Hasan, 
and Tsionas, 2015).    
Finally, acknowledging the context of market conditions and recognising heterogeneity 
amongst borrower profiles is essential to progress prevailing debate regarding the impact of 
gender upon women business owner’s access to bank finance. In an era where caution has 
been re-valued, women entrepreneurs may reap unexpected and positive rewards; a key 
contribution of our analysis will be to offer impetus for future research which critically 
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evaluates whether the advantages arising during a recessionary period can challenge a long 
term gendered status detriment.  In other words, will there be a legacy for women which 
repositions them as safer bets regardless of the economic context? If this effect is emerging, 
this will undermine the current foundational assumptions regarding gender, women and bank-
lending requiring far reaching revisions of such arguments.   Finally, there is, however, a 
paradox here; if risk aversity generates a feminised advantage attractive to banks, the quality 
which generates the advantage prevents women from taking advantage of it!  Thus, further  
longitudinal analysis is required to fully evaluate the potential of this suggested advantage and 
to what extent ‘trickle down’ effects, whereby as more women do gain bank loans, act as 
encouragement for others to borrow who might ameliorate levels of risk through collateral 
levels.  
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Group Variable Name Definition 
Demand for finance 
 
 
SOUGHT = 1 if applying finance in the past 12 months; 0 otherwise 
 DISCOURAGED = 1 if discouraged borrower; 0 otherwise  
 NEED = 1 if needing external finance; 0 otherwise 
Supply of finance  
GOT = 1 if firm receive at least part of the finance applied for; 0 otherwise 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Group Variable Name Definition 
Firm-characteristics 
 
Size EMPS Micro (0 – 9 employees), Small (10 – 49 employees), Medium (50 – 249 employees)  
SALES_BAND 1=<£25,000, 2=£25-49,999, 3=£50,000-74, 999, 4=£75,000-99,999, 5=£100,000-
499,999, 6=£500,000-999,999, 7=£1m-1.99m, 8=£2m-4.99m, 9=£5m-9.99m 
Legal status LEGAL 1= Sole Proprietor, 2=Partnership, 3= Limited Liability Partnership, 4= Limited Liability 
Industry sector SECTOR 1=Primary, 2= Manufacturing, 3=Construction, 4=Wholesale/Retail, 5=Hotels/Catering, 
6=Transport & Communications, 7=Business Services, 8=Health, 9=Other Community 
Age FIRM_AGE 1= <12 months, 2= 1-2 years, 3= 2-5 years, 4=6-9 years, 5=10-15 years, 6=>15 years 
Performance PROFIT The actual profit/loss of the firm during the past 12 month, in £ mil.  
FAST_GROWTH =1 if firm grew by 30% or more; 0 otherwise 
Owner characteristics 
 
Gender WLED = 1 if firm is a women-led business; 0 otherwise 
Education ONWER_EDUC 1=None, 2=GCSE, 3= A level, 4= HNC, 5=BTEC, 6=Professional, 7=Degree, 8=Post-
graduate Degree, 9=Other 
Prior experience OWNER_EXP 1= <12 months, 2= 1-3 years, 3= 4-6 years, 4=7-9 years, 5=10-15 years, 6=>15 years 
Financial 
Qualification 
FIN_QUAL =1 if owner has a financial qualification; 0 otherwise 
Time indicators WAVE1 = 1 if July-2011 Survey; 0 otherwise 
WAVE2 = 1 if November-2011Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE3 = 1 if March-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise  
WAVE4 = 1 if May-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise  
WAVE5 = 1 if November-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise  
WAVE6 = 1 if March-2013 Survey; 0 otherwise 
Risk indicators  
Experian Credit Rating RISK = 1if minimal, 2 if low risk, 3 if average risk and 4 if above average risk  
Financial Delinquency  
Missed loan repayment 
Unauthorised overdraft 
facility 
Bounced cheques 
County court judgement 
Late tax 
Trade credit restrictions 
None 
FD_LR 
FD_OD 
 
FD_BC 
FD_CCJ 
 
FD_TAX 
FD_TCR 
 
FD_NONE 
= 1 if missed loan repayment; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if had unauthorised overdraft facility; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if bounced cheques; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if has County Court Judgement; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if missed tax payments; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if has trade credit restrictions; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if no financial delinquency; 0 otherwise 
Additional Control Variables  
Source of funds OWN_EQUITY = 1 if entrepreneur uses own equity; 0 otherwise 
Business activities INNOVATOR = 1 undertook innovation activities; 0 otherwise 
 NEW_PROCESS = 1if  introduced new or significantly improved process; 0 otherwise 
 NEW_PRODUCTS = 1 if introduced new or significantly improved products; 0 otherwise 
 EXPORTER = 1 if business export products or services overseas; 0 otherwise 
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN = 1 if has a formal written business plan; 0 otherwise 
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Table 2: Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2)  
 Male (N = 19,838*) Female (N = 7,151*) (1) – (2) 
Panel A: Dependent variables    
Group Variable Name Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean 
Demand for finance SOUGHT 0.235 0.424 0.241 0.428  
 DISCOURAGED 0.061 0.239 0.069 0.254 * 
 NEED 0.335 0.472 0.351 0.477  
Supply of finance GOT 0.898 0.303 0.904 0.294  
Panel B: Independent variables      
Firm-characteristics      
Size EMPS      
 Micro (0 – 9) 0.514 0.500 0.613 0.487 *** 
 Small (10 – 49) 0.343 0.003 0.294 0.005 *** 
 Medium (50 – 249) 0.143 0.002 0.092 0.003 *** 
 SALES_BAND      
 <£25,000 0.130 0.336 0.190 0.393 *** 
 £25,000 - £49,999 0.093 0.291 0.111 0.315 ** 
 £50,000 - £74,999 0.054 0.227 0.074 0.261 *** 
 £75,000 - £99,999 0.042 0.199 0.054 0.227 *** 
 £100,000 - £499,999 0.146 0.353 0.203 0.402 *** 
 £500,000 - £999,999 0.194 0.395 0.097 0.295 *** 
 £1m - £1.99m 0.102 0.302 0.090 0.287 *** 
 £2m - £4.9m 0.084 0.278 0.063 0.242 *** 
 £5m - £9.9m 0.047 0.211 0.024 0.153 *** 
Legal status LEGAL      
 Sole proprietorship 0.296 0.456 0.268 0.443  
 Partnership 0.064 0.245 0.195 0.396 *** 
 Limited liability partnership (LLP) 0.078 0.268 0.026 0.160 *** 
 Limited liability(LTD) 0.562 0.496 0.512 0.500 *** 
Industry sector SECTOR      
 Primary 0.072 0.258 0.073 0.260  
 Manufacturing 0.100 0.300 0.080 0.272 *** 
 Construction 0.246 0.431 0.091 0.288 *** 
 Wholesale / retail 0.087 0.281 0.107 0.310 *** 
 Hotels / catering 0.061 0.240 0.134 0.341 *** 
 Transport & communications 0.086 0.281 0.070 0.255 *** 
 Business services 0.163 0.369 0.162 0.369  
 Health 0.050 0.218 0.163 0.370 *** 
 Other community 0.135 0.342 0.119 0.324 *** 
Age FIRM_AGE      
 <12 months 0.041 0.197 0.057 0.232 *** 
 1-2 years 0.050 0.219 0.063 0.243 *** 
 2-5 years 0.141 0.348 0.186 0.389 *** 
 6-9 years 0.118 0.322 0.157 0.364 *** 
 10-15 years 0.137 0.343 0.159 0.366 *** 
 15+ years 0.514 0.500 0.378 0.485 *** 
Performance PROFIT (£mil) 0.189 0.550 0.125 0.377 *** 
 FAST_GROWTH 0.118 0.323 0.145 0.352 *** 
Owner characteristics       
Education ONWER_EDUC      
 None 0.218 0.413 0.101 0.302 *** 
 GCSE 0.101 0.301 0.136 0.343 *** 
 A level 0.059 0.237 0.089 0.285 *** 
 HNC 0.051 0.219 0.054 0.226  
 BTEC 0.114 0.318 0.101 0.301 *** 
 Professional qualification 0.110 0.313 0.131 0.337 *** 
 Degree 0.110 0.313 0.162 0.369 *** 
 Post graduate degree 0.078 0.267 0.115 0.319 *** 
 Other 0.006 0.079 0.008 0.091  
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Table 2 (Continued)  
   
   
Prior experience OWNER_EXP      
 <12 months 0.021 0.142 0.033 0.179 *** 
 1-2 years 0.067 0.249 0.090 0.286 *** 
 2-5 years 0.081 0.272 0.116 0.320 *** 
 6-9 years 0.070 0.255 0.093 0.290 *** 
 10-15 years 0.136 0.343 0.166 0.372 *** 
 15+ years 0.600 0.490 0.489 0.500 *** 
Financial FIN_QUAL 0.400 0.490 0.345 0.476 *** 
Qualification       
Risk indicators       
Experian Credit Rating 
RISK      
Minimal 0.148 0.355 0.146 0.353  
 Low 0.244 0.430 0.188 0.391 *** 
 Average 0.246 0.431 0.273 0.445 *** 
 Above average 0.276 0.447 0.288 0.453 * 
 Not known 0.085 0.280 0.106 0.307 *** 
Financial Delinquency      
Missed loan repayment FD_LR 0.013 0.112 0.013 0.112  
Unauthorised overdraft  FD_OD 0.059 0.236 0.073 0.260 *** 
Bounced cheques FD_BC 0.058 0.235 0.072 0.258 *** 
County court judgement FD_CCJ 0.013 0.114 0.011 0.103 ** 
Late tax FD_TAX 0.074 0.261 0.090 0.286 *** 
Trade credit restrictions FD_TCR 0.040 0.196 0.035 0.184 *** 
None FD_NONE 0.823 0.382 0.793 0.405 *** 
Additional Controls      
Source of funds OWN_EQUITY 0.094 0.291 0.099 0.298  
Business activities INNOVATOR 0.460 0.498 0.527 0.499 *** 
NEW_PROCESS 0.420 0.494 0.483 0.500 *** 
 NEW_PRODUCTS 0.203 0.403 0.227 0.419 ** 
 EXPORTER 0.131 0.338 0.092 0.289 *** 
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN 0.412 0.492 0.462 0.499 *** 
Note: Except for GOT (N = 5,016 and 1,746 for male and female, respectively), where data is only collected for firms that applied for 
finance. 
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Table 3: Loan Demand, Supply and Discouragement: Probit Models with Sample 
Selection 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
  GOT|SOUGHT SOUGHT DISCOURAGE|NEED NEED 
Group Variable Name Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Gender WLED 0.151* 0.086  -0.105** 0.045  -0.156** 0.064  -0.184*** 0.042  
Firm Characteristics         
Size EMPS         
 Small (10-49) 0.296** 0.128  -0.138*** 0.049  -0.059 0.070  -0.095** 0.047  
 Medium (50-249) 0.415** 0.192  -0.014 0.075  -0.129 0.128  -0.089 0.077  
Turnover SALES_BAND         
 £25,000 - £49,999 -0.038 0.104  0.121** 0.059  -0.160** 0.073  0.067 0.049  
 £50,000 - £74,999 -0.297** 0.136  0.342*** 0.073  -0.063 0.097  0.160** 0.064  
 £75,000 - £99,999 0.094 0.148  0.229*** 0.081  -0.076 0.122  0.128* 0.072  
 £100,000 - £499,999 -0.179 0.122  0.359*** 0.065  -0.008 0.089  0.233*** 0.058  
 £500,000 - £999,999 -0.296 0.275  0.418*** 0.085  0.020 0.113  0.290*** 0.084  
 £1m - £1.9m -0.235 0.213  0.452*** 0.098  -0.043 0.145  0.306*** 0.089  
 £2m - £4.9m -0.253 0.235  0.466*** 0.095  0.041 0.163  0.130 0.097  
 £5m - £9.9m -0.209 0.294  0.306** 0.141  -0.177 0.156  0.272* 0.143  
Legal status LEGAL         
 Partnership 0.152 0.144  0.088 0.057  -0.013 0.079  0.114* 0.060  
 LLP  0.497** 0.245  -0.056 0.117  -0.123 0.159  -0.063 0.105  
 LTD 0.028 0.107  -0.075 0.052  -0.001 0.070  0.010 0.047  
Industry sector SECTOR         
 Manufacturing -0.066 0.189  -0.107 0.090  -0.035 0.130  -0.127 0.081  
 Construction -0.170 0.147  -0.137** 0.065  -0.045 0.100  -0.134** 0.060  
 Wholesale / retail 0.108 0.171  -0.084 0.073  0.119 0.108  0.034 0.067  
 Hotels / catering -0.534*** 0.156  -0.128* 0.076  0.154 0.110  -0.093 0.069  
 Transport & com -0.097 0.176  -0.111 0.084  0.022 0.114  -0.104 0.074  
 Business services 0.043 0.149  -0.212*** 0.066  -0.107 0.101  -0.171*** 0.060  
 Health 0.123 0.204  -0.307*** 0.089  -0.086 0.144  -0.274*** 0.081  
 Other community -0.142 0.205  -0.368*** 0.101  -0.231 0.146  -0.250*** 0.089  
Age FIRM_AGE         
 1-2 years 0.165 0.163  -0.001 0.107  -0.378*** 0.126  -0.369*** 0.091  
 2-5 years 0.411** 0.164  0.056 0.097  -0.313*** 0.119  -0.338*** 0.084  
 6-9 years 0.588*** 0.178  0.138 0.103  -0.475*** 0.127  -0.315*** 0.090  
 10-15 years 0.668*** 0.203  0.198* 0.105  -0.495*** 0.137  -0.311*** 0.093  
 15+ years 0.289 0.187  0.293*** 0.101  -0.576*** 0.132  -0.324*** 0.091  
Performance PROFIT (£1 mil) 0.330 0.240  -0.064 0.062  -0.727*** 0.177  -0.205*** 0.065  
 FAST_GROWTH -0.041 0.108  0.060 0.058  0.025 0.081  0.051 0.054  
Owner Characteristics         
Education OWNER_EDUC         
 GCSE 0.075 0.143  0.039 0.075  0.037 0.095  0.169*** 0.063  
 A level 0.359** 0.172  -0.031 0.083  0.250** 0.107  0.166** 0.075  
 HNC -0.093 0.172  -0.068 0.089  -0.108 0.123  0.006 0.076  
 BTEC -0.178 0.142  -0.066 0.074  0.054 0.093  0.098 0.060  
 Professional -0.215 0.148  -0.039 0.080  -0.003 0.108  0.115* 0.068  
 Degree 0.080 0.151  -0.004 0.082  0.040 0.100  0.101 0.068  
 Postgraduate 0.083 0.181  -0.090 0.091  0.083 0.117  0.148* 0.078  
 Other 0.139 0.407  -0.129 0.156  0.356 0.223  0.057 0.157  
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Prior  OWNER_EXP         
experience 1-2 years -0.308 0.211  0.214 0.133  0.023 0.161  0.169 0.111  
 2-5 years -0.092 0.224  0.102 0.133  -0.012 0.166  0.141 0.111  
 6-9 years -0.203 0.240  0.121 0.140  0.135 0.172  0.199* 0.118  
 10-15 years -0.097 0.226  0.201 0.132  0.056 0.167  0.189* 0.112  
 15+ years 0.069 0.217  0.203 0.128  0.026 0.163  0.166 0.109  
 FIN_QUAL 0.167* 0.090  -0.048 0.046  -0.022 0.063  -0.017 0.040  
Time Indicators         
 WAVE2 -0.226* 0.121  -0.157** 0.064  -0.155* 0.092  -0.124** 0.057  
 WAVE3 -0.190 0.134  0.673*** 0.067  0.199** 0.090  0.229*** 0.057  
 WAVE4 -0.062 0.142  0.587*** 0.064  0.352*** 0.084  0.242*** 0.055  
 WAVE5 -0.251** 0.128  0.593*** 0.065  0.407*** 0.086  0.212*** 0.057  
 WAVE6 -0.421*** 0.137  0.581*** 0.068  0.416*** 0.092  0.244*** 0.059  
Risk Indicators         
Experian  RISK         
Credit Rating Low -0.351* 0.202  -0.009 0.089  0.061 0.111  0.094 0.079  
 Average -0.442*** 0.156  -0.051 0.083  0.197* 0.104  0.041 0.075  
 Above average -0.503*** 0.151  0.002 0.085  0.344*** 0.105  0.157** 0.076  
 Not known -0.744*** 0.161  0.050 0.091  0.266** 0.114  0.156* 0.082  
Financial Delinquency         
 FD_LR -0.371** 0.187  0.081 0.166  0.000 0.140  0.119 0.161  
 FD_OD -0.320** 0.126  0.401*** 0.094  0.184* 0.096  0.648*** 0.088  
 FD_BC -0.141 0.119  0.036 0.094  -0.141 0.092  0.011 0.089  
 FD_CCJ -0.247 0.176  -0.119 0.170  0.243* 0.139  0.181 0.153  
 FD_TAX 0.111 0.125  0.047 0.100  -0.231** 0.097  0.114 0.090  
 FD_TCR -0.560*** 0.130  0.008 0.113  0.358*** 0.102  0.308*** 0.108  
 FD_NONE 0.265** 0.123  -0.131 0.094  -0.404*** 0.094  -0.293*** 0.090  
          
Fund source OWN_EQUITY -0.247** 0.099  0.230*** 0.063  0.321*** 0.083  0.393*** 0.060  
Business INNOVATOR 0.135 0.192  0.122 0.102  0.025 0.155  -0.049 0.100  
activities NEW_PROCESS -0.267 0.180  0.026 0.094  0.065 0.142  0.184** 0.092  
 NEW_PRODUCTS -0.089 0.103  -0.077 0.062  0.192** 0.079  0.104* 0.058  
 EXPORTER -0.228** 0.115  0.042 0.066  -0.018 0.088  0.062 0.064  
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN -0.214*** 0.078  0.152*** 0.040  0.116** 0.054  0.121*** 0.037  
Regression Diagnostics         
 N Obs  26,989    26,989 
  
 Censored  20,227    17,315 
  
 Uncensored  6,762    9,674 
  
 Wald χ2 (64)  1,354.69    1,639.48 
  
 Prob >χ2  0.00001    0.00001 
  
 
LR Test if 
Independence χ2 (1)  6.040    18.300 
  
 Prob >χ2  0.020    0.001 
  
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Weights applied.  11 UK 
regional dummies are used as exclusion restrictions. Base categories: EMPS = Micro (0-9 employees); 
SALES_BAND = £0 – £24,999; LEGAL = Sole proprietorship; SECTOR = Primary; FIRM_AGE = 0 – 1 year; 
OWNER_EDUC = No qualification; OWNER_EXP = 0 – 1 year; RISK = Minimal.
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Table 4: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Results 
  
Prob(SOUGHT) Prob(GOT|SOUGHT) 
   Overall Effect   Overall Effect  
   Coefficient Std Error   Coefficient Std Error  
 Male-led SMEs  0.1816*** 0.0044    0.8447*** 0.0098   
 Female-led SMEs   0.1456*** 0.0059    0.8996*** 0.0347  
 Male – Female  0.0360*** 0.0074    -0.0550 0.0361  
 Endowment Effect  0.0189*** 0.0045    -0.0122 0.0114  
 Discrimination Effect  0.0171** 0.0072    -0.0428 0.035  
   Individual Effect   Individual Effect  
  Endowment Discrimination Endowment Discrimination 
Group Variable Name Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Firm Characteristics         
Size EMPS         
 Small (10-49) -0.0002** 0.0001  -0.0003    0.0003  -0.0003 0.0002 0.0006    0.0008 
 Medium (50-249) -0.0000 0.0000  0.0000    0.0001  0.0003* 0.0002 -0.0001    0.0002 
Turnover SALES_BAND         
 £25,000 - £49,999 0.0018** 0.0009  0.0013    0.0023  0.0003 0.0018 -0.0009    0.0028 
 £50,000 - £74,999 0.0014** 0.0006  -0.0002    0.0014  -0.0004 0.0007 0.0025    0.0024 
 £75,000 - £99,999 0.0004 0.0003  -0.0013    0.0008  -0.0004 0.0006 0.0022    0.0017 
 £100,000 - £499,999 -0.0011* 0.0006  0.0008    0.0017  0.0002 0.0012 0.0069    0.0043 
 £500,000 - £999,999 0.0008*** 0.0003  -0.0005    0.0005  0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003    0.0014 
 £1m - £1.9m 0.0002 0.0002  -0.0003    0.0004  0.0000 0.0002 0.0000    0.001 
 £2m - £4.9m 0.0002** 0.0001  -0.0001    0.0002  -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000    0.0006 
 £5m - £9.9m 0.0002** 0.0001  -0.0001    0.0001  -0.0000 0.0002 0.0003    0.0002 
Legal status LEGAL         
 Partnership -0.0011 0.0008  0.0004    0.0008  -0.0028 0.0029 -0.0001    0.002 
 LLP  -0.0000 0.0001  -0.0003    0.0003  -0.0006 0.0009 0.0004    0.0008 
 LTD 0.0003 0.0003  -0.0001    0.0029  0.0002 0.0011 -0.0018    0.0053 
Industry sector SECTOR         
 Manufacturing 0.0002 0.0002  -0.0011    0.0013  0.0001 0.0004 0.0033    0.0026 
 Construction -0.0069** 0.0032  0.0009    0.0014  -0.0081 0.0056 0.0059**  0.0028 
 Wholesale / retail 0.0009 0.0008  -0.0006    0.0022  -0.0021 0.0028 0.0122*   0.0064 
 Hotels / catering 0.0010* 0.0006  0.0009    0.0008  0.0049*** 0.0018 0.0008    0.0019 
 Transport & com -0.0011 0.0007  0.0004    0.0009  -0.0019 0.0014 0.0011    0.0013 
 Business services 0.0005 0.0006  0.0026    0.0041  0.0001 0.0006 0.0066    0.0069 
 Health 0.0075*** 0.0020  0.0020    0.0020  0.0003 0.0023 0.0048*   0.0025 
 Other community 0.0050*** 0.0016  0.0046    0.0031  0.0008 0.0013 0.0003    0.0032 
Age FIRM_AGE         
 1-2 years -0.0000 0.0002  0.0059**  0.0028  0.0001 0.0007 -0.0014    0.0021 
 2-5 years -0.0005 0.0008  0.0136**  0.0064  -0.0029 0.0031 0.0023    0.0055 
 6-9 years -0.0004 0.0004  0.0082*   0.0042  -0.0025 0.0032 0.0010    0.0046 
 10-15 years -0.0002 0.0004  0.0073**  0.0036  -0.0012 0.0035 -0.0027    0.0046 
 15+ years 0.0053*** 0.0019  0.0116**  0.0052  0.0066* 0.0036 0.0004    0.0068 
Performance PROFIT (£1 mil) -0.0001 0.0001  0.0024**  0.0011  0.0006 0.0006 -0.0035    0.0025 
 FAST_GROWTH -0.0004 0.0004  0.0011    0.0015  0.0002 0.0006 0.0004    0.0022 
Owner Characteristics         
Education OWNER_EDUC         
 GCSE 0.0001 0.0002  -0.0001    0.0020  -0.0000 0.0004 0.0071*   0.0038 
 A level 0.0001 0.0004  0.0008    0.0015  -0.0021 0.0016 0.0008    0.0027 
 HNC -0.0001 0.0002  -0.0012    0.0011  0.0003 0.0005 0.0028    0.0018 
 BTEC -0.0014 0.0015  0.0016    0.0022  -0.0035 0.0026 0.0016    0.0027 
 Professional 0.0002 0.0004  0.0024    0.0021  -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0006    0.0024 
 Degree 0.0002 0.0013  0.0029    0.0030  -0.0006 0.0011 0.0105**  0.0045 
 Postgraduate 0.0011 0.0012  0.0001    0.0022  -0.0005 0.002 0.0033    0.003 
 Other 0.0000 0.0001  0.0004    0.0004  0.0001 0.0008 -0.0000    0.0001 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
    
Prior  OWNER_EXP         
experience 1-2 years -0.0012 0.0009  -0.0144**  0.0056  0.0024 0.0022 0.0064    0.0065 
 2-5 years -0.0004 0.0007  -0.0146*** 0.0055  0.0004 0.0009 0.0036    0.0055 
 6-9 years -0.0002 0.0003  -0.0078**  0.0035  -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0001    0.004 
 10-15 years -0.0005 0.0005  -0.0131**  0.0053  0.0002 0.0011 0.0041    0.0083 
 15+ years 0.0036 0.0025  -0.0291*** 0.0107  0.0011 0.0028 0.0050    0.0164 
 FIN_QUAL 0.0006 0.0006  -0.0005    0.0024  0.0024 0.0022 0.0064    0.0065 
Time Indicators         
 WAVE2 -0.0002 0.0003  -0.0005    0.0022  -0.0006 0.001 -0.0001    0.0017 
 WAVE3 -0.0021 0.0014  0.0027    0.0025  -0.0000 0.0004 0.0040    0.0038 
 WAVE4 -0.0013 0.0012  -0.0024    0.0021  -0.0011 0.0013 -0.0046    0.0038 
 WAVE5 -0.0010 0.0012  -0.0002    0.0021  0.0000 0.0001 -0.0045    0.0039 
 WAVE6 0.0013 0.0011  -0.0004    0.0020  -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0013    0.0031 
Risk Indicators         
Experian  RISK         
Credit Rating Low -0.0000 0.0000  0.0027    0.0018  -0.0002 0.0009 0.0012    0.003 
 Average 0.0002 0.0003  0.0080*   0.0047  0.0007 0.0019 0.0084    0.0061 
 Above average 0.0000 0.0001  0.0144*   0.0076  -0.0010 0.0025 0.0067    0.0089 
 Not known 0.0001 0.0002  0.0040    0.0027  -0.0021 0.0028 0.0012    0.0033 
Financial Delinquency         
 FD_LR 0.0000 0.0001  -0.0001    0.0005  -0.0003 0.001 0.0002    0.0007 
 FD_OD 0.0018*** 0.0007  -0.0007    0.0011  -0.0005 0.0007 0.0052*   0.0031 
 FD_BC 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0007    0.0011  0.0003 0.0005 0.0028    0.0021 
 FD_CCJ -0.0001 0.0002  0.0008*   0.0005  -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0001    0.0004 
 FD_TAX -0.0000 0.0001  -0.0004    0.0011  -0.0004 0.0006 0.0022    0.002 
 FD_TCR 0.0001 0.0003  -0.0017**  0.0007  0.0017 0.0019 0.0017    0.0015 
 FD_NONE 0.0005 0.0004  -0.0179    0.0166  0.0003 0.0013 0.0208    0.0146 
          
Fund source OWN_EQUITY 0.0000 0.0002  0.0002    0.0007  0.0004 0.0005 0.0015    0.0016 
Business INNOVATOR -0.0020 0.0018  0.0194*   0.0105  -0.0018 0.0023 -0.0182    0.0174 
activities NEW_PROCESS -0.0004 0.0013  -0.0171**  0.0086  0.0029 0.0026 0.0239    0.0159 
 NEW_PRODUCTS 0.0010 0.0009  -0.0010    0.0025  0.0009 0.0011 -0.0027    0.0035 
 EXPORTER 0.0001 0.0002  -0.0001    0.0010  -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0016    0.0016 
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN -0.0021*** 0.0007  0.0020    0.0029  0.0008 0.001 0.0045    0.0045 
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Weights applied.  Inverse 
mills ratio adjustment applied to predict Prob(GOT|SOUGHT). Base categories: EMPS = Micro (0-9 
employees); SALES_BAND = £0 – £24,999; LEGAL = Sole proprietorship; SECTOR = Primary; FIRM_AGE = 
0 – 1 year; OWNER_EDUC = No qualification; OWNER_EXP = 0 – 1 year; RISK = Minimal. 
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Table 5: Robustness Check – The Effect of Macroeconomic Conditions 
 Proxies for macroeconomic conditions 
 
Model 1 
Quarterly GDP growth (QGDP, %) 
Model 2 
Year dummies (2011, 2012, 2013, base category = 2011)1 
 Prob(GOT|SOUGHT) Prob(SOUGHT) Prob(GOT|SOUGHT) Prob(SOUGHT) 
Variable Name Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
WLED 0.348** 0.007 0.029 -0.038 
 (0.174) (0.082) (0.137) (0.069) 
QGDP -0.463*** -0.269***   
 (0.139) (0.066)   
WLED*QGDP -0.503* -0.188   
 (0.270) (0.127)   
2012   -0.062 0.709*** 
   (0.126) (0.051) 
2013   -0.341** 0.675*** 
   (0.155) (0.069) 
WLED * 2012   0.157 -0.083 
   (0.177) (0.089) 
WLED * 2013   0.245 -0.095 
   (0.299) (0.123) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: 
1. Assuming the further away from the crisis, the better the economic environment. 
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Table 6: Robustness Check – The Effect of Financing Constraints and Collateral 
Availability 
 Proxy for financing 
constraints 
 
Proxies for collateral availability 
 Model 1 
Profit/loss (£mil) 
(PROFIT) 
 Model 2 
Security provided to support 
application  
(SECURITY, 0,1)1 
Model 3 
Credit balance 
 (CBALANCE)2 
Model 4 
Legal status 
(LEGAL)3 
 Prob(SOUGHT)  Prob(GOT) Prob(GOT|SOUGHT) Prob(GOT|SOUGHT) 
Variable Name Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
WLED -0.087* 0.138    0.158 0.232* 
 (0.049) (0.111)    (0.102) (0.139) 
PROFIT -0.018    
 (0.067)    
WLED * PROFIT -0.350**    
 (0.175)    
SECURITY  2.299***   
  (0.217)      
WLED*SECURITY  -0.867**    
  (0.401)      
CBALANCE (£10k – 
£100k) 
  -0.011  
  (0.120)  
CBALANCE (> £100k)   -0.037  
   (0.219)  
WLED * CBALANCE 
(£10k – £100k) 
  -0.020  
  (0.228)  
WLED * CBALANCE (> 
£100k) 
  1.013***  
  (0.369)  
Partnership    0.180 
    (0.161) 
LLP     0.833** 
    (0.381) 
LTD    0.059 
    (0.117) 
WLED * Partnership    -0.109 
    (0.260) 
WLED * LLP    -0.714 
    (0.503) 
WLED * LTD    -0.152 
    (0.188) 
Control Variables 
 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: 
1. SECURITY only available for firms applying for finance (=1 if security provided to support finance 
application, and 0 otherwise) so no selection effect considered.  
2. CBALANCE measures the business’ cash holding in current and deposit account, which is a proxy for the 
security pledged against the borrowing. Base category = £0 to £10,000. 
3. Limited companies are only secured to the extent of equity whilst unlimited companies are obliged to pay 
the entire liability regardless of equity value 
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Table 7: Robustness Check – The Effect of Risk Preferences 
 Proxies for risk preferences 
 
Model 1 
Number of financial institutions 
used  
(BANKUSED)1 
Model 2 
Number of external advice sources 
used  
(ADVICEUSED)2 
Model 3 
Whether used, or intend to use 
funds from friends and family 
(SOFTFIN)3 
 Prob(GOT|SOUGHT) Prob(GOT) Prob(GOT|SOUGHT) 
Variable Name Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
WLED 1.086** 0.119 0.219** 
 (0.554) (0.119) (0.097) 
BANKUSED -0.266   
 (0.267)   
WLED * BANKUSED -0.910**   
 (0.466)   
ADVICEUSED  -0.037  
  (0.116)  
WLED * ADVICEUSED  0.350*  
  (0.193)  
SOFTFIN   -0.262** 
   (0.126) 
WLED *SOFTFIN   -0.353 
   (0.232) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: 
1. Up to 5 banks used (mean = 1.03).  
2. Up to 4 sources used (mean = 0.2). The variable is only observed for finance applicants so unconditional 
probit is used. 
3. Owners relying more heavily on soft finance are supposed to be more risk-averse. 
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Table 8: Robustness Check – The Joint Effect of Collateral Availability, Risk 
Preferences and Macroeconomic Conditions 
 Prob(GOT) 
Variable Name Coefficient 
WLED 0.459* 
 (0.252) 
SECURITY 2.320*** 
 (0.526) 
ADVICEUSED 0.152 
 (0.267) 
QGDP -0.429** 
 (0.200) 
WLED * SECURITY -0.577 
 (0.651) 
WLED * ADVICEUSED -0.494 
 (0.466) 
WLED * QGDP -0.560 
 (0.390) 
SECURITY * ADVICEUSED 0.628 
 (0.769) 
SECURITY * QGDP 0.524 
 (0.812) 
ADVICEUSED * QGDP -0.321 
 (0.432) 
WLED * SECURITY * ADVICEUSED 17.242*** 
 (3.344) 
WLED * SECURITY * QGDP -0.612 
 (1.089) 
WLED * ADVICEUSED * QGDP 1.267* 
 (0.758) 
SECURITY * ADVICEUSED * QGDP -1.136 
 (1.174) 
WLED * SECURITY * ADVICEUSED * QGDP -18.419*** 
 (4.003) 
Control variables Yes 
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: Both SECURITY and ADVICEUSED are only observed for finance applicants so unconditional probit is 
used. 
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Table 9: Summary of hypotheses and empirical findings 
Hypothesis Gender Effect 
 Sought Finance Got Finance 
H1a Yes  
H1b No  
H2a  No 
H2b  Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Figure 1: Historical Loan Demand by Gender (Weighted) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Historical Loan Supply by Gender (Weighted) 
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Appendix A: Details of the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
In the context of this study, let YF and YM denote the outcome variables for models 
estimating the probabilities of demanding loans or loan application being granted for male and 
female owned ventures, respectively; and X a vector of predictors for Y. We are interested in 
how much of the mean outcome difference,  
 = E(YM) − E(YF)                                                          (1) 
where E(Y) is the predicted outcome variable from a linear probit model, is accounted for by 
group differences in the predictors X. 
Further let  be the coefficient estimates from the model, it can be shown that following 
the standard assumptions of linear regressions, the mean outcome difference  can be written 
as: 
 = E(YM) − E(YF) = E(XM)'M − E(XF)'F                                   (2)   
Now, if we introduce a ‘non-discriminatory’ coefficient vector * embedded in the 
coefficient estimates , that accounts for the part of mean outcome probability differences 
explained by the predictors,  Eq (2) can be rearranged as:  
             FFMMFM XEXEXEXE    ** '''                 (3) 
Eq (3) can be seen as a twofold decomposition where the first component,  
      'FM XEXEQ                                              (4) 
is defined as the ‘quantity effect’ referring to the part of the outcome differential explained by 
group differences in X. In turn, the second component,  
       FFMM XEXEU   ** ''                               (5) 
can be seen as the unexplained part usually attributed to discrimination6, as it depicts the 
differences in the sensitivities to predictors for different groups. The non-discriminatory 
coefficient vector * is suggested in previous studies either to be equal to the coefficient 
estimates of one of the groups (e.g. male) assuming that discrimination is only directed 
towards the other group (e.g. female), or a weighted average of group coefficient estimates M 
and F, or the coefficients from a pooled regression. In this study, we define * as the 
coefficients from pooled probit regressions on loan demand and supply7. 
 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that the unexplained component U also captures all the other potential effects of 
differences, for example, in omitted variables. 
7 We also attempt other specifications of * and the results are not significantly different from each other. 
